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This paper evaluates critically the discourse of ‘economic globalisation’. This discourse 
extend  the  belief  that  capitalist  firms  now  produce  the  vast  majority  of  goods  and 
services produced in the world (i.e., the commodification thesis) by asserting that this 
process of commodification is increasingly taking place within an open world economy 
in  which  firms  operate  in  a  deregulated  and  seamless  global  marketplace.  In  the 
economic globalisation thesis, therefore, it is a specific type of commodified economy 
that is becoming hegemonic and stretching its tentacles wider and deeper across the 
globe, namely unregulated or ‘free market’ capitalism composed of hyper-mobile and 
homeless capital operating in a borderless world. 
The  main  aim/objective  of  this  paper  is  to  contest  the  narrative  of  economic 
globalisation  adopted  by  the  globalists,  demonstrating  its  performative  character.  In 
doing so, it will contest the view that globalisation is the only future, and display how 
the  future  is  more  open  than  suggested  by  its  proponents.  This  thesis  will  use  the 
Gambia to produce empirical evidence of the shallowness of economic globalisation. 
So far data that will be use in writing up this paper will be secondary data, but however I 
am due to be going for a field work in the Gambia in July this year to carryout empirical 
research,  using  a  barrage  of  techniques  to  collect  my  data.  Methods  will  include  a 
structured questionnaire that will be used to measure the embeddedness of Gambian 
households  in  the  globalisation  process,  and  also  semi-ethnography  to  evaluate  the 
impacts of economic globalisation. 
Although I have not yet reached any results, my research will more than likely prove 
that: 
· Globalisation is a performative discourse. 
· The lived practices/coping strategies of households have less to do with globalisation. 
· The informal economy in West Africa (The Gambia) is not demising as proposed by 
the globalists, rather it is increasing. 
·  Globalisation  (Capitalist  globalisation)  is  not  the  formula  for  the  socio-
economic development of West Africa (The Gambia). 
·  The future is open to other alternatives. 
Being the first of its kind in the Gambia, that is to my knowledge, my research other 
than seeking to challenge the hypotheses of globalisation (akin to commodification and 
formalisation) also seeks to create some policy implications which would enable the 
Gambia and other West African states to target social assistance and strengthen their 
civil society and instruments of sustainable human development in the informal sector. 
I strongly believe that unless and until great steps are taking by Gambians and other 
West Africans to address the current socio-economic equation, we in the Gambia and 
the West African sub-region will continue to suffer untold socio-economic problems 
which will continue to facilitate the development of underdevelopment, and strengthen Growth and Development 
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our own marginalisation that has already been set in motion. I feel that the first and 
foremost step of the many great steps that would need to be taken, is the studying of the 
past  and  present  socio-economic  conditions  of  the  Gambia  and  its  relationship  with 
capitalist globalisation which will certainly lead to a comprehensive understanding of 




























































The  discourse  of  globalisation  has  been  regarded  as  both  positive  and  negative. 
Viewed from a neo-liberal ‘hyperglobalist’ perspective, globalisation is a triumph of political 
liberalism and of the unfettered play of market forces and as likely to strengthen the economic 
and  social  basis  for  the  unity  of  humankind  by  offering  fresh  possibilities  for  ‘new 
partnerships’ in the world order (Jinadu, 1999). 
From the anti-globalist perspective however, contemporary globalisation depicts the 
dominant neo-liberal paradigm, a new form of  imperialism in which  global financial and 
corporate institutions dominate the global economic and political space. Indeed they argue 
that  it  has  imposed  a  violent,  post-colonial  imperialism;  deepened  social  hierarchies  (e.g. 
class,  gender  etc.);  extinguished  vulnerable  cultures;  facilitated  the  development  of 
underdevelopment; undermined every fabric of community; massively aggravated ecological 
degradation; and compromised every claim to knowledge, scientific or otherwise (Axford, 
1995; Ake, 1996; Osuji, 1997; Thomas and Wilkin, 1999). 
From  this  viewpoint,  for  majority  of  the  advanced  economies,  the  process  of 
globalisation has brought about socio-economic success. Globalisation has been a means of 
tapping more into cheap labour, resources, capital and markets. However, for most ‘third 
World’  countries  if  not  all,  particularly  in  sub-Saharan  Africa,  globalisation  has  been  an 
awesome and terrifying phenomenon, enlivening the venomous potency of mass poverty and 
its accompanying multidimensional depravity of the citizenry of all the requisite essence of 
meaningful living (Akindele et al, 2002). More than anything, globalisation has raised the 
dynamics of under development (Ake, 1996). Globalisation through its economic liberalism 
and success for the “developed” World ‘has been elevated to the position of absolute truth, a 
sort of pensee unique or single theory against which there is no credible alternative’ (AAPS, 
1999) for socio-economic development. 
To  this  effect,  this  paper  will  contest  the  neo-liberalist  notions  of  economic 
globalisation, exposing its performative and hallow nature and unveiling how it has being a 
means of socio-economic devastation and destabilisation in sub-Saharan Africa particularly 
the  Gambia.  It  will  also  argue  against  the  neo-liberalist  notion  that  socio-economic 
development in sub-Saharan Africa is only dependent on the strict adherence to the principles 
and modus operandi of economic globalisation, in most cases designed or influenced by the 
Bretton Wood Institutions working in the interests of ‘advanced’ economies.  
 
Economic Globalisation the Highest Stage of Neo-liberal Extremism   
 
Today,  the  majority  of  the  world  particularly  those  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  are 
considered  to  be  suffering  from  a  disease  of  economic  malnutrition  and  socio-economic 
underdevelopment. The only prescription from Dr. neo-liberalism to such a well-constructed 
fate is economic globalisation or at least an enlistment into the ‘global’ economy. But what 
exactly is economic globalisation. This is a nebulous concept that has been opened to different 
interpretations, making it difficult to construct a precise definition. However for the purpose 
of this paper and its objective, economic globalisation will be defined from a neo-liberalist 
spectrum. Neo-liberals view economic globalisation as the recent and rapid intensification of 
international trade and investment which is disintegrating and reintegrating distinct national 
economies  into  a  single  homogenous  global  economy,  a  development  that  can  neither  be 
resisted nor significantly influenced by human intervention, particularly through traditional 
political  institutions,  such  as  nation-states  (Held,  2000).    Thus  this  process  of  economic 
globalisation is said to lead to a cross-border integration of factor, intermediate products, and 
final products markets along with increasing salience of multinational corporations (Prakash, Growth and Development 
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1999).  Neo-liberals  also  extend  the  view  that  this  process  of  economic  globalisation  is 
removing all national barriers to the free movement of international capital and resources, 
which  involve  trade  liberalization,  free  market  mobility,  commercialisation  and  the 
empowerment  of  trans-national  corporations.  For  the  optimistic  globalist  (neo-liberals), 
economic globalisation is something that should be celebrated as it ‘benefits consumers by 
increasing  the  scale  and  allocative  efficiency  of  markets  for  both  goods  and  capital’ 
(Williams, 2005). 
To fully comprehend the thesis of economic globalisation, it is imperative to conjure 
the ‘formalisation’ and ‘commodification’ theses because such theses’ are akin to each other. 
The formalisation thesis stipulates that ‘goods and services are increasingly provided through 
the formal economy (the state and market spheres) and the informal economy is in demise’ 
(Williams,  2005).  It  also  views  the  informal  sector  as  a  constraint  to  socio-economic 
development, as it breeds socio-economic backwardness and underdevelopment (Williams, 
2005). It also perceives the informal sector as ‘primitive or traditional, stagnant, marginal, 
residual,  weak,  about  to  be  extinguished;  a  leftover  of  pre-capitalist  formations  that  the 
inexorable  and  inevitable  march  of  formalisation  will  eradicate’  (Williams,  2005).    The 
conceptualisation of the informal sector by the formalisation thesis can be summed up in the 
words of Seabrook (2003) a populists commentator who pronounce that ‘the western poor are 
dead  souls…hustlers  and  survivors,  economic  shadows  in  the  shadow  economy,  the 
discouraged and despairing who have fallen through the bottom line of accounting systems’ 
(9-10; cited from Williams, 2005). 
The commodification thesis on the other hand (also known as the ‘commercialisation’ 
or marketization’ thesis; see Williams, 2005), extends the view that ‘the formal production 
and delivery of goods and services is increasingly occurring through the market sector rather 
than by the state or informal spheres’ (Williams, 2005). This phenomenon has become a “near 
universal belief” (Lee, 1999, 200a; Polanyi, 1944; Scott, 2001; Smith, 2000; Watts, 1999; 
cited from Williams, 2005) due to the proliferation of capitalism and the neo-liberal doctrine. 
The commodification thesis has attracted many proponents some of whom argue that ‘the 
marketplace is a pervasive force in our lives’ (Rifkin, 2003; cited from Williams 2005); that 
capitalism is altering ‘every human interaction into a transient market exchange’ (Ciscel and 
Heath,  2001:cited  from  Williams,  2005);  that  ‘markets  are  subsuming  greater  portions  of 
everyday life’ (Gudeman, 2001; cited from Williams 2005); that ‘capitalism stands alone as 
the only feasible way rationally to organise a modern economy’ (De Soto, 2001: cited from 
Williams, 2005); and that ‘all plausible alternatives to capitalism have now evaporated’ (De 
Soto, 2001). As pronounced by Amin et al (2002b: cited from Williams, 2005) ‘the pervasive 
reach of exchange-value society makes it ever more difficult to imagine and legitimate non-
market forms of organisation and provision’. Thus the commodification thesis extends the 
view that goods and services are increasingly produced for exchange, that such exchanges are 
increasingly monetised and that such monetised exchanges are occurring for the purpose of 
profit.  To  this  effect  the  commodified  realm  is  perceived  as  becoming  the  economic 
institution rather than one mode of producing and delivering goods and services amongst 
many (Williams, 2005). 
Akin  to  the  formalisation  and  commodification  theses,  is  the  globalisation  thesis 
which espouses the notion that not only are goods and services produced and delivered by 
multinational corporations (capitalist firms) for the motive of profit making but also that such 
an operation is taking place in a ‘borderless and seamless open world economy in which 
hyper-mobile and homeless capital restlessly roams the globe unrestrained in search of profit-
making opportunities’ (Williams, 2005). Within the confinements of this thesis therefore, this 
supposed to be seamless and borderless world is controlled by and left at the mercy of market 





doctrine has made economic globalisation appear as if it were natural, normal and inevitable, 
like an absolute sovereign. Thus neo-liberals poise that for better or for worst we are all being 
affected by this inevitable and powerful force of economic globalisation and that our actions, 
decisions  and  activities  in  one  corner  of  the  globe  would  have  rapid  and  significant 
repercussions on people and places on other parts of the globe (Wiseman, 1998). But to what 
extent are people’s lives embedded into this global economy? Or how much of economic 
globalisation  is  taking  place?  Or  is  economic  globalisation  just  another  hallow  and 
performative discourse?  To comprehend this, I would put into consideration the informal 
sector of the Gambia, which is similar to almost all informal sectors in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Defining the Informal Sector in the Gambia   
 
The  informal  economy  has  been  derogatorily  caricatured  by  some  as  the  ‘black 
market’,  ‘the  criminal  underworld’,  ‘the  world  turned-upside  down’,  ‘the  underground 
economy’ (Smithies, 1984; Feige, 1989), whilst others have more positively labelled it as an 
‘alternative’, ‘shadow’, ‘parallel’, ‘clandestine’, and ‘household’ economy (Gerxhani, 2004; 
Charms, 1990; Harding & Jenkins, 1989). Well at least in the Gambia it is coined as the 
‘domestic economy’ (Action Aid the Gambia, 2005) Whereas some hold the notion that the 
informal  sector  is  a  leftover  of  pre-capitalist  social  formations,  others  (Williams  & 
Windebank, 1998) actually argue that despite the existence of capitalist activities (economic 
restructuring, government policies, market deregulation, and direct foreign investment), the 
informal sector remains a large, vibrant and growing sphere of economic activity.  
Indeed, in the African sub-continent, the informal economy constitutes almost 80% of 
non-agricultural employment, over 60% of urban employment and over 90% of new jobs in 
the past decade (ILO, 2002). Whilst this may demonstrate the rate, growth, vastness and scope 
of the informal sector, it also signifies its importance and status in Africa particularly in 
countries like the Gambia.  But what exactly is meant by the informal sector? The informal 
sector can be classified into two: the paid and unpaid informal sectors 
The informal economy as a concept was first introduced into academic literature by 
Keith Hart (1970), a social anthropologist, who used the concept to depict a part of the urban 
labour force, which operated outside the confinements of the formal labour or global market 
in Ghana and Kenya. This was later used to refer to the strategies employed by individuals to 
earn their living outside the formal/global economy either as alternatives, complements, and 
or supplements to it (Bromley & Gerry, 1979). The International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
first used the concept in the 1970s to refer to the activities of the working poor whose hard 
work was neither recognised, regulated, protected nor recorded by governments and public 
authorities (ILO, 2002).  
The informal economy also came to have a geographical dimension in that the notion 
of  the  informal  sector  was  implicitly  linked  to  the  urban  economy,  a  tendency  that  has 
continued  to  persist  (Todaro,  1987).  However,  with  continued  investigation  in  academic 
literature, some researchers came found out that the informal sector was far more pervasive, 
applying equally to urban and rural areas. For instance, King (1990) highlights that, in the 
1980s, there seem to be some point in re-conceptualizing the informal sector as the ordinary 
economy  cutting  across  rural  and  urban  areas,  agriculture  and  commerce,  across  survival 
skills and income- generating strategies (1990, p5). 
 The informal economy has also been described as a “residual sector”, a source of 
employment for those who are unable to find employment in the formal/global economy. In 
the context of this definition, the informal sector workers are regarded as low productivity 
workers. However, empirical research has shown that this is not necessarily the case. For 
example,  Charmes  (1990)  found  evidence  which  suggested  that  informal  sector  workers Growth and Development 
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generally contributed to GDP over and beyond the minimum wage. Furthermore, he argued 
that productivity in the informal sector was much higher than average per capita GNP in the 
economy. When the current situation of the Gambia is put under observation, where over 70% 
of the total workforce is employed by the informal sector, this argument may seem to be to 
very true. Another important factor that has not received attention until recently is the non-
trivial numbers of households engaging in both informal and formal sector activities (King 
1990). 
The informal economy has also come to be widely used to describe an expanding and 
skyrocketing diverse group of workers and enterprises in both rural and urban areas operating 
informally, who are neither recognised nor protected under the legal regulatory frameworks, 
henceforth  been  exposed  to  a  high  level  of  vulnerability.  In  the  ILO’s  2002  report,  such 
people are said to include ‘own-account workers in survival type activities, such as street 
vendors,  shoe-shiners,  garbage  collectors,  scrap  and  rag  pickers,  paid  domestic  workers 
employed by households, home-workers, workers in sweatshops (usually disguised as wage 
workers in production chains), self-employed workers in micro-enterprises (operating on their 
own or with contributing family workers), and apprentices’.  In most cases, people engaged in 
the informal sector are usually subjected to exploitative institutional arrangements with low 
incomes, unstable and irregular jobs. In addition, they have no voice for representation and 
are often placed at a competitive disadvantage as a result of their lack of influence. Some are 
often put under horrendous conditions and because most of their informal activities often lie 
on the periphery of the law, public officials who normally interpret such activities as criminal 
usually subject them to harassment, bribery, extortion and repression (ILO, 2002).  Although 
some of these activities also take place in the formal sector however, the distinction between 
the formal and informal sector is that those in the formal sector are protected and recognised 
by  public  authority,  laws  and  regulations,  whilst  those  in  the  informal  sector  remained 
unrecognised and unprotected. 
The ILO also postulates that although the informal sector is not recognised by laws 
and regulations, this does not necessarily mean that there are no norms or rules orchestrating 
it.  In fact some argue that the informal sector has got, its own “political economy”, with its 
own informal group rules, arrangements, institutions and structures for mutual help and trust, 
providing loans, organising training, transferring technology and skills, trading and market 
access, enforcing obligations etc (ILO, International Labour Conference Report, 2002).  
Another way to comprehending the informal sector is to take a look at the ‘seven 
essential securities’ in relation to those who engage themselves in the informal sector, which 
they  are  often  denied.  These  include  labour  market  security,  employment  security,  work 
security, job security, skill production security, income security, and representation security. 
The absence of all these securities is what leads to exploitation, repression, unproductive and 
unremunerative jobs, inadequate social protection and lack of representation, which the ILO 
labelled as “decent work deficits” (ILO, 2002). 
Williams & Windebank (1998) also describe the informal economy as a large and 
growing sector of paid economic activity, which goes beyond the territory of the formal wage 
economy.  They  also  postulate  that  such  economic  activities  are  usually  ‘unregistered’  or 
‘hidden’ from the state for tax, social security and labour law purposes, but which are legal in 
all other respects. In as much as I may want to concur with some aspects of this description of 
the  informal  sector  in  terms  of  some  of  the  illegal  economic  activities  like  child  sex 
exploitation and child labour which are usually hidden away from laws and regulations, I will 
also want to inject myself with reality not to be totally eclipsed by the Eurocentric aspects of 
this  definition.  Although  some  aspects  of  this  definition  will  perfectly  fit  in  an  African 
context, as it is very true that some individuals or enterprises in the Gambia deliberately 





which have laws to deal with them, but which they try to hide from such laws, however, there 
are also certain informal economic activities which do not necessarily hide away from the 
laws, thus not been dealt with. This is often due to the deficiency of laws to deal with them in 
the Gambia. Charmes (1998; p4) pronounces that establishments ‘often go unregistered, they 
do not pay relevant taxes, not only or not mostly out of a desire or willingness to escape and 
to remain concealed, but more likely because of the inability of governments to enforce often 
inadequate regulations’ 
 Thus, the element of ‘hidden’ may not necessarily apply in a Gambian context, where 
90% of informal economic activities are used as survival strategies. In Europe or America, 
laws are created to deal with all forms of economic activities in some shape or form because 
of their level of economic development and maturity, which may not necessarily be the case 
in countries like the Gambia, thus resulting in the lack of sufficient laws to cover a wide range 
of economic activities.  
The unpaid informal sector consists of two broad categories of unpaid work. First, 
there is the ‘self-provisioning’ type, which according to Williams (2005) refers to the ‘unpaid 
household work undertaken by household members for themselves or for other members of 
their households’. The second type of unpaid work that constitutes part of the non-wage sector 
is the ‘unpaid community work’, which refers to ‘work provided on an unpaid basis by and 
for the extended family, social or neighbourhood networks and more formal voluntary and 
community  groups,  and  ranges  from  kinship  exchange,  through  friendship/neighbourly 
reciprocal exchanges to one-way volunteering for voluntary organisations’ (Williams, 2005).  
In the case of the Gambia, the unpaid informal sector comes in the form of voluntary 
groups,  youth  organisations,  cultural  associations  and  religious  groups.  Indeed,  such 
participants more often than not serve as intermediaries between aid donors, NGOs and the 
local communities in the Gambia. 
 
The Scope and Nature of the Paid Informal Sector in the Gambia 
  
According to the ILO’s labour market report (2000), 72.4% of total employment in the 
Gambia is in the informal sector. This report also confirms that 66.1% of the participants are 
males, whilst women constitute over 82.7% of the overall informal sector in the Gambia. The 
informal  sector  absorbs  a  large  and  growing  fraction  of  the  labour  force,  and  provides  a 
"safety net" for the poor, who find themselves excluded from formal employment (global 
economy) and income opportunities. However, with the slow, or even negative, growth of 
formal sector employment opportunities in the Gambia, combined with a rapid and significant 
growth in the urban labour force, economic stabilization and restructuring programmes, and 
the quest for increased flexibility and deregulation of the economy, it was estimated that in 
the near future, the informal sector will form over 90% of the total Gambian workforce (ILO, 
1997).  
The  scope  of  the  informal  sector  in  the  Gambia  includes  diverse  activities;  it 
represents a heterogeneous universe, irreducible to any subset of specific rules of economic 
calculation  (Castells  &  Portes,  1989),  especially  with  the  continuous  proliferation  of  the 
informal sector. Based on the recently concluded Economic Census of the Gambia (2005), 
there  is  clear  indication  that  the  informal  sector  is  evolving  along  the  borders  of  social 
struggles, incorporating those too weak to defend themselves, rejecting those who are too 
conflictive, and propelling those with stamina and resources into surrogate entrepreneurship 
(Castells & Portes, 1989). Because of the heterogeneity of definitions of what the informal 
economy is, it becomes very problematic to identify a structure for it. However because the 
informal sector is being dealt with from the Gambian context, I will in no way hesitate to use 
the  Gambia  government’s  description  of  the  informal  sector,  which  more  than  anything Growth and Development 
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focuses on the number of employees and registration. Although the definition of the informal 
establishments  varies  from  industry  to  industry,  however  in  a  more  generalist  view  all 
establishments  employing  less  than  five  employees  are  considered  informal  (Gambia 
Economic Census, 2005). 
The 2005 economic census concludes that two hundred and ten thousand (210,000) 
people  are  employed  by  eighty  two  thousand  one  hundred  and  seventy  (82,170) 
establishments  in  both  formal  and  the  informal  sector.  Out  of  the  82,170  establishments, 
75,977 (92%) employ less than five people whilst the remaining 6,193 (8%) employ more 
than five people. Out of the 75,977 establishments that employ less than five people 10,066 
(7%) are registered whilst 65,911 (93%) remain unregistered. In the case of the establishments 
employing  five  or  more  people,  2692  remain  registered  whilst  3501  are  unregistered. 
Henceforth if the number of employees is the only criterion for defining the informal sector, 
then it is the case that about 92% of all establishments operate under the informal economy 
and if registration is the only criterion then it means that the informal sector consumes up to 
79% of all establishments in the Gambia, whilst the formal sector only takes 21%. 
Based  on  the  revelations  of  the  economic  census,  the  informal  sector  is  more 
concentrated in the urban areas of the Gambia. The Gambia is administratively divided into 
eight regions, three of  which (Banjul, Kanifing, Brikama) are considered to be the urban 
regions whilst the remaining five (Mansakonko, Kerewan, Kuntaur, Janjangbureh, Basse) are 
considered to be the rural or provincial areas. Out of the 75,977 of all establishments in the 
informal  sector,  59,175  (85%)  are  concentrated  in  the  urban  regions  (Banjul,  Kanifing, 
Brikama) whilst the remaining 16,802 (15%)  are found in the  rural or provincial regions 
(Mansakonko, Kerewan, Kuntaur, Janjangbureh, Basse).  
Industry wise the trade sector (wholesale & retail) happens to be the dominant area 
where most informal economic activities take place as it accounts for 56,000(75%) of all the 
informal establishments in the Gambia, followed by the manufacturing sector which accounts 
for 9,000 (12%). The utilities, mining and quarrying sector accounts for 63 establishments 
(0.084%)  whilst  the  finance  and  insurance  sector  happens  to  be  the  area  where  the  least 
informal  economic  activities  take  place  (51  establishments  (0.068%).  According  to  the 
population census of the Gambia (2003), the Gambia has about 1.3 million people, 476, 439 
(35%)  of  which  are  employed  in  the  formal  and  informal  sectors  and  884,242  (65%) 
unemployed (not engaged in any form of formal or informal economic activities). Meanwhile, 
more  men  (64%)  are  engaged  in  the  informal  sector  in  the  Gambia  than  women  (36%).  
Within the paid informal sector in the Gambia, men dominate the fishing sector (58%), the 
manufacturing sector (81%), the construction sector (94%), the transport sector (90%), the 
communications sector (76%), the finance and insurance sector (77%), the education sector 
(73%), the health and social work sector (75%), and the community and social services sector 
(59%), whilst women account for 90% of the agricultural sector, 56% of the wholesale and 
retail industry, and 53% of the hotel and restaurant sector.  
Based on the above statistical data extrapolated from the 2005 economic census of the 
Gambia, the informal sector seemed to have grown by 20% from the year 2000 (that is from 
72%  (ILO,  2000)  to  92%  in  2005).  Although  this  information  does  not  give  a  real 
representation of the informal sector in the Gambia as it fails to consider the unpaid sector to 
be a component of the informal sector, and individuals who neither are a part of the informal 
establishments  but  who  just  do  their  own  personal  businesses  (like  shoe-shiners,  and 









The Scope and Nature of the Unpaid Informal Sector in the Gambia 
 
Although  the  paid  informal  sector  has  received  more  attention  than  the  unpaid 
informal sector in academic literature and research, which has overshadowed the significant, 
existence, and socio-economic velocity of the unpaid informal sector, the Gambia happens to 
be an exceptional case where more people are involved in the unpaid informal sector than 
both the paid informal and formal sectors put together. According to the 2003 population 
census, the Gambia recorded 1.3 million people out of which only an estimated 410, 000 
(35%) are employed in both the formal and paid informal sectors. This leaves more than 
890,000 (65%) of the population unemployed (not even in the paid informal sector), resulting 
in a high level of dependency and   poverty (69% of the population live below the poverty 
level). One intriguing question that would need to be answered is whether the 65% of the 
population  excluded  from  both  the  formal  and  paid  informal  sectors  really  makes  them 
participants in the non-wage informal sector. In answering this question, I will focus on the 
definitions  forwarded  by  Williams  (2005),  thereby  dividing  the  structure  into  youth 





In his concluding remarks on the state opening of the 2003 National Assembly, the 
president of the Gambia (Dr.Yahya Jammeh) stated as follows;  
The Youth constitute a significant proportion of the country’s population …I therefore 
call on the youths, in particular, to engage themselves in the informal sector and in trades-
manship,  as  it  is  apparent  that  Government  cannot  achieve  its  goals  alone  without  the 
necessary support and participation of all Gambian…  This Government is calling on the 
youths and encouraging them to engage in self-employment in agriculture and other sectors of 
the economy in order to address the issue of unemployment in this country. (State Opening of 
the National Assembly Sessional Paper 1, 2003) 
Indeed the Gambia is well nourished with a vibrant youth (15-29 years) sector, which 
constitutes well over 60% of its population. It is the case in the Gambia that the majority of 
the youth population is engaged in the non-waged informal sector through community youth 
organisations. It is even the case that most youths who are the in paid informal and formal 
sectors also participate in the non-waged informal sector. 
The Gambia happens to be well furnished with a variety of youth groups/organisations 
who  actively  engage  themselves  in  different  development-oriented  activities  within  the 
parameters  of  socio-economic  well-being.  Such  activities  usually  include  community 
development projects like building and rehabilitation of community schools, health centres, 
skills centres, local bakeries and environmental sanitation. For instance in 1997 in the village 
of Old Jeshwang (seven (7) km away from Banjul the capital city of the Gambia), where a 
primary school (Old Jeshwang Primary School), which caters for the educational needs of 
more than one thousands pupils was falling apart a youth association (known as the Youth 
Association for Advancement) together with two other youth groups, rehabilitated the school 
into a brand new one. All the rehabilitation work was undertaken by the local members of the 
associations without any form of payment. The Youth Association for Advancement has also 
carried  out  numerous  cleansings  exercises  (known  as  ‘set-settal’)  in  the  Old  Jeshwang 
Village.  This  process  charges  the  local  members  of  the  youth  association  with  the 
responsibility  of  clearing  and  dumping  community  wastes,  cleaning  rubbishes  from 
community streets, creating drainages systems during the rainy seasons and also recycling 
recyclable  products.  Not  only  do  youth  associations  like  YAA  rebuild  and  rehabilitate Growth and Development 
  306 
schools, health centres  and skills centres, but they  also provide the human resources (i.e. 
teachers, teaching assistants, nurses, and other experts)  to facilitate the smooth running of 
such centres. This is where youths who participate in the paid informal and formal sectors 
come in as volunteers rather than paid people. In the urban and rural regions of the Gambia, 
there  are  over  a  hundred  youth  organisations  that  engage  in  such  community  initiatives 
without any forms of payments. 
Meanwhile, other  youth organisations in the Gambia like the Kanifing East Youth 
Development  Society  (KEYDS),  the  Bakau  Youth  Association  for  Children’s  Welfare 
(BYCAW), Lend a Hand Society (LHS) and the Organisation for Future Development (OFD) 
render community services such as vocational skills training to disadvantaged young men and 
women in local communities, sponsor local students in schools, produce local products like 
jam,  mayonnaise,  poultry  and  diary  products,  and  agricultural  products  to  their  local 
communities. Some even construct boreholes in their local communities to cater for the need 
of safe  and hygienic drinking water. All such  community services  are rendered by  youth 
organisations in the Gambia through their local members free of charge (no form of payment 
involved). 
 
Voluntary Groups      
 
Voluntary groups play a very pivotal role in the socio-economic development of the 
Gambia. Whilst some of the voluntary groups are international (like the Red Cross, Girls 
Guide,  Rotary  International),  others  are  local  voluntary  groups  some  of  which,  are  based 
outside the Gambia (like the Gambia United Society based in the UK, the Gambia Education 
Support  Organisation  in  Denmark)  and  the  rest  based  inside  the  Gambia  (like  Kingfisher 
Trust, Bafrow etc). The unpaid services they render to the local communities in the Gambia 
ranges  from  education,  health,  agriculture,  trade,  vocation,  through  to  environment, 
manufacturing, finance and transport.  For instance Kingfisher Trust the Gambia, which is a 
non-political and sectarian community-oriented group, has carried out a significant number of 
community projects in different local communities in the Gambia since its inception in 1990. 
For  example  within  the  local  community  of  Yuna,  it  has  created  more  than  sixty-five 
vegetable gardens for the locals, built a number of local shops, created an area for sheep 
fattening  and  poultry,  build  a  complete  carpentry  and  metal  workshop,  a  garden  store,  a 
swing, and also provided a significant number of bicycles and sewing machines. In addition, it 
also  provides  the  human  resource  and  expertise  in  training  the  locals  to  sow  and  knit, 
carpentry and metalworking, typing and computing, and also in food maximisation techniques 
and methods. The group has also been actively involved in building nursery and primary 
schools  in  local  communities  whilst  at  the  same  time  giving  sponsorship  to  deserving 
children. There are over three hundred (300) community voluntary groups currently operating 
in the Gambia, carrying out similar works like those of Kingfisher Trust the Gambia. These 
initiatives are usually undertaken by local members of such community groups without any 
forms of payment. 
 
Self-Provisioning in the Gambia   
       
The  Gambia  as  a  society  of  diverse  people  is  culturally  oriented  and  believes  in 
holding family ties more than anything. Unlike Europe and America where family separation 
in most cases starts when somebody reaches the age of eighteen (18), in the Gambia, families 
always stick together, living in the same compound for four to five generations (sometimes 
until death reap them apart). The extended family system forms the core of the Gambian 





roles.  As  a  very  patrimonial  society,  the  male  (husband,  brother,  uncle,  grandfather)  is 
generally marked with the responsibility of providing sustenance for all the family members, 
ensuring the protection of family members and property and also undertaking all repair and 
maintenance  work  that  proves  to  be  physical.  The  female  (mother,  wife,  sister,  aunt, 
grandmother) is expected to care for the children, cook meals, clean the compound, wash the 
family clothes and also when possible do subsistence farming. The grandparents in most cases 
sit at home to look after the children, tell them stories and history, and teach them manners, 
values, culture and religion. A high level of sharing and caring takes place among family 
members.  An  average  extended  family  living  in  the  same  compound  in  the  Gambia  may 
consist of up to twenty-five people. Any work that is to be done has got a head (a decision 
maker) and where the work proves to be complex and difficult; a family meeting is usually 
convened to do analysis of the work to see how the family members could do it. Such works 
usually undertaken by family members may range from building houses, cultivating a family 
farm, to constructing a drainage and sewage system and digging wells for fresh water. Where 
children become old and mature enough, females are taken to the farm to learn and help their 
mothers, whilst males go with their fathers to their workshops to help and learn from them. 
Although this may not necessarily be the case in the urban regions of the Gambia, however 
one has to bear in mind that almost 60% to 70% of the Gambian population leave in the rural 
areas. Even in the urban regions of the Gambia, a high level of self-provisioning takes place 
due  the  government’s  inability  to  provide  the  basic  social  amenities  for  the  people.  For 
instance in the greater Banjul area, waste collection from family homes is supposed to take 
place once every week, but due to the government’s inability to cater for such needs, families 
would often come to combine forces to get rid of such wastes which usually create breeding 
grounds for mosquitoes.  In addition, because of poor roads, streets in most local communities 
can just be likened to mini lakes when it rains. To this, again families often come together to 
create temporal drainage systems to ooze rainwater from their homes and local communities.   
 
Contrasting  the  Gambian  Informal  Sector  and  the  Globalisation  (Akin  To 
Commodification and Formalisation) Thesis   
 
The current nature, scope and composure of the informal sector in the Gambia greatly 
challenges the claims of both the ‘formalisation’ and ‘commodification’ theses (see Williams, 
2005). The formalisation thesis stipulates that ‘goods and services are increasingly provided 
through the formal economy (the state and market spheres) and the informal economy is in 
demise’ (Williams, 2005). It also views the informal sector as a constraint to socio-economic 
development,  which  brings  about  socio-economic  backwardness  and  underdevelopment 
(Williams, 2005). Based on the current nature of the paid informal sector in the Gambia, 
informal economic activities cannot be viewed as a euphemism for poverty because poverty is 
linked to the process of distribution whilst the informal sector is related to production, but 
rather it can be viewed as a mechanism that the Gambia government is tolerating and even 
stimulating in order to resolve ‘potential social conflicts and to promote political patronage’ 
(Castells & Portes, 1989). Thus in the Gambia, the paid informal economy has become a 
means of coping with ‘population growth, rural-urban migrations, economic crises, poverty 
and indebtedness’ (Charmes, 1998). 
In addition, although the informal sector in the Gambia reinforces the geographical 
dimension (that is the notion that the informal sector is implicitly linked to the urban economy 
(Todaro, 1987)) as 85% of all informal establishments are concentrated in the urban regions 
of the Gambia, however, it also indicates that the informal sector is also active in the rural 
regions of the Gambia (15% of all informal establishments). One particular reason for the 
urbanisation or the concentration of the informal sector in the urban regions of the Gambia is Growth and Development 
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the high level of rural-urban migration that started from the development decades  (1965-
1985), which witnessed the centralisation of all development activities in the urban regions. 
The current unpaid informal sector in the Gambia also debunks the hypothesis of the 
‘commodification thesis’ (also known as the ‘commercialisation’ or marketization’ thesis; see 
Williams,  2005),  which  postulates  that  ‘the  formal  production  and  delivery  of  goods  and 
services  is  increasingly  occurring  through  the  market  sector  rather  than  by  the  state  or 
informal spheres’ (Williams, 2005). As observed by Williams (2005) 
…a worrying and disturbing finding once one starts to investigate the musings of the 
above adherents to commodification, is that hardly any evidence is ever brought to the 
fore either to show that a process of commodification is taking place or even to display 
the extent, pace or unevenness of its penetration 
The argument I want to raise here is that probably all the lamentations being done on 
behalf of the commodification, formalisation and globalisation theses are (a) very subjective 
in nature (in the sense that all such comments made are influenced by the socio-cultural and 
politico-economical orientations and environments of the commentators), and (b) that they are 
very  Eurocentric  because  they  failed  to  look  beyond  the  West  in  order  to  give  in-depth 
considerations to African countries like the Gambia as reflected in the active existence and 
contributions  made  by  the  unpaid  informal  sector  in  the  Gambia.  I  also  argue  that  such 
commentators lack complete socio-cultural competence of non- western countries like the 
Gambia,  and  that  they  only  present  what  is  given  to  them  by  the  custodians  of  western 
development (the capitalists) rather than conducting their own empirical research to establish 
reality.  Although  commodification  may  be  the  principal  embodiment  of  the  structural 
adjustment  programmes  and  economic  recovery  programmes  that  are  currently  been 
experimented on and implemented by most African countries like the Gambia, however the 
present  equation  of  the  unpaid  informal  sector  in  the  Gambia  suggests  that  the 
commodification thesis at best can be described as a ‘vague theory and thin empirics’ (Martin 
and Sunley, 2001; cited from Williams, 2005), and at worst as the delusion of the illusionist.  
 
Economic  Globalisation  a  Source  of  Socio-Economic  Underdevelopment  and 
Destabilisation: The Case of the Gambia 
   
Since independence in 1965, the Gambia has tailored its socio-economic policies, both 
externally  and  internally  devised,  to  conform  to  the  apparently  inevitable  and  immutable 
future of globalisation. Its endeavour to formalise its economy and eventually become more 
integrated into the globalisation process (global economy) has been centred around the neo-
liberal premise that a formalised/globalised economy will contribute positively to national 
socio-economic development, particularly through job creation, income generation, poverty 
reduction, expansion of economic opportunities as well as increased participation of people in 
national planning and decision making (Private Sector & Food Production Report, 2002).  
However, economic globalisation has compelled countries like the Gambia to open up 
to international trade, remove barriers to foreign investment, and reduce corporate regulations 
and taxes, as well as other disincentives to vibrant economic activities. The deliberate policy 
factors driving economic globalisation include the advocacy for and implementation of the 
new free-market economic order following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates in 1971 (UNDP, HDR 1999).  
In the Gambia and most ‘third’ world countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leon, Costa 
Rica, Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso) tools used for implementing this approach among other 
things included liberalization and privatization reforms that were embedded in the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) introduced around 1985.  This period witnessed the removal 





(GPMB)  as  the  Gambia  moved  towards  liberal  and  free  market  policies.  The  Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERP) initiated and supported by the World Bank in supplementing 
Gambia’s  efforts  towards  a  free  market  economy  and  free  capital  mobility,  led  to  the 
eradication  of  import  and  export  licensing  requirements,  the  liberalisation  of  foreign 
transactions, customs tariff reduction and mass unemployment. Paradoxically, like in many 
other  ‘third’  World  countries,  economic  globalisation  increased  the  Gambia’s  demand  for 
social insurance whilst decreased its capacity to provide it.  
Around 1985, the Gambia’s inability to meet its debt service obligation, coupled with 
its inability to secure commercial credits resulted in domestic shortages of vital and basic 
commodities such as rice, sugar, electricity, water and petroleum (Sallah, 1990). In countering 
such a socio-economic situation, the economic recovery programme financed by the IMF and 
World Bank was introduced with the aims of curtailing inflation, boosting annual real GDP 
growth by 3.3%, creating a viable volume of official foreign exchange reserves, reducing 
external arrears, and normalising relations with creditors (Sallah, 1990). However, the most 
outstanding  aim  of  the  ERP  was  to  revitalise  the  economy  and  make  it  self-sustainable 
through world market adaptation (Fyhri, 1998).  This programme saw the formalisation of all 
sectors  in  the  Gambia  as  the  government  embarked  on  a  comprehensive  mission  of 
liberalising the pricing and marketing structures in the Gambia to encourage private sector 
participation  on  socio-economic  activities,  whilst  at  the  same  time  enforcing  stringent 
discipline on demand management through appropriate monetary, fiscal, exchange-rate, and 
external debt policies (Sallah, 1990). The government also adopted a tight policy over public 
enterprises, and government apparatus through financial and administrative reforms such as 
reducing the size and scope of the civil services, and also strengthening the financial and tax 
system. As Sallah (1990) stipulates, a major element of the overall ERP reform package was 
to introduce a floating system so as to divert business from the “black market” or “parallel 
market”, which was thought to be diverting much business and badly needed scarce foreign 
exchange from the formal banking system and other sectors (World Bank, 1989). 
Indeed  the  IMF  in  its  Enhanced  Structural  Adjustment  Facility  Policy  Framework 
Paper (1998-2000) pronounce that under the Economic Recovery Program, strong economic 
policies and a broad range of socio-economic reforms were put in place, which included a 
tight  fiscal  policy  involving  improved  expenditure  control  and  an  enlarged    tax  base, a 
restrictive monetary policy,  strengthened economic incentives, including the lifting of most 
price controls and the introduction of a market-determined exchange rate in the context of a 
liberalized trade and payments system and the divestiture of a number of public enterprises 
and the strengthening of the financial position and operations of enterprises remaining in the 
public  domain.  The  implementation  of  such  formalisation  policies  was  supported  by  the 
international community, in particular by the International Monetary Fund with a three-year 
arrangement  under  the  Enhanced  Structural  Adjustment  Facility  (ESAF)  that  expired  in 
November 1991, and by the World Bank through structural and sectoral lending, including the 
second structural adjustment loan (SAL II), which got completed in June 1992. Sehn (1992a) 
further pronounce that economic recovery, which formed the core of structural adjustment in 
sub-Saharan  Africa  included  measures  such  as  exchange  rate  devaluation,  fiscal  policy 
restructuring,  monetary  discipline  and  interest  rate  rationalization,  as  well  as  an  array  of 
institutional  reforms  that  involved  redefining  the  role  of  the  state  and  public  enterprises 
engaged in a range of activities including control of agricultural input and product marketing.  
For  some  (IMF,  World  Bank,  the  Gambia  government),  the  externally  devised 
economic recovery programme brought about tremendous economic growth and development 
to  the  Gambian  people.  Sallah  (1990)  postulates  that  the  introduction  of  the  economic 
recovery programme significantly improved the Gambia’s economy, whilst the World Bank 
report (1989) stated that ‘since the adoption of the ERP, the rate of inflation has dropped from Growth and Development 
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70 percent in 1985/86 to about 9 percent in 1987/88…and an average annual increase in real 
GDP  of  5.5  percent  during  1986-8’.  The  IMF  in  its  Policy  Framework  Paper  1998-2000 
mentioned that the Gambia until mid 1993 made significant progress in reducing financial 
imbalances, liberalising its economy, and strengthening its basis for durable economic growth 
through the economic recovery programme. 
However, the question that is often ignored is whether such economic growth and 
stabilisation  really  got  translated  into  socio-economic  development  or  whether  the  local 
Gambians  equally  shared  such  views  of  economic  advancement.  Well  according  to  the 
People’s Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS), the real purpose 
of the ERP was not to facilitate the development of the productive sectors of the economy but 
to programme it in such a way that the Gambia would be able to repay its loans and interests 
on them, by hook or by crook…the government was now to be the local tax collector of the 
international money lenders (Foroyaa Newspaper, 1989; cited from Sallah, 1990: 629) 
Others  have  also  accused  this  formalisation  programme  for  greatly  contributing  to 
increased poverty and food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa particularly the Gambia (Cornia, 
Jolly and Stewart, 1987), where to-date 69% of the population live below the average poverty 
line. Wadda (2000) stipulates that although macroeconomic indicators gained the recognition 
and  approval  of  the  Bretton  Wood  institutions,  however  more  people  fell  into  poverty, 
illiteracy and poor health. In the case of The Gambia for instance, the introduction of the 
economic recovery programme in 1985 saw the retrenchment of up to 3,324 employees out of 
the 14,224 government employees by December 1985, whilst seven hundred positions were 
suppressed (Touray, 2002). Such redundant workers were labelled as “excess baggage” by the 
government.  This  act  of  retrenchment  carried  out  in  the  name  of  efficiency  led  to  the 
proliferation of unemployed people in the Gambia   and increased their deprivation. 
The introduction of the economic recovery programme in the Gambia also initiated the 
elimination  of  subsidies  on  essential  goods  and  services  such  as  farm  tools,  fertilizers, 
medicine, and education (Touray, 2002). This worsened the deprivation of the poor and the 
unemployed. As   Pleskovic and Bruno (1995) observe, ‘one of the great tragedies of the 
1980s in Africa and Latin America was not only their poor economic performance but also the 
simultaneous reduction in government expenditure’. The reduction in government expenditure 
resulted  in  the  deterioration  of  public  infrastructure,  decrease  in  the  quality  of  service 
delivery, and increase in the cost of basic essential services such as health care and education 
(Touray, 2002). For instance according to the National Report on Sustainable Development 
(2002), total expenditure in the social sectors of health and education was reduced from 32% 
in 1984/85 to 14% in 1987/88 in the Gambia.  These coupled with increased taxation and the 
introduction of a tax-based economy further increased the gap between the poor and rich and 
also the untold suffering of the poor and rampant corruption. In The Gambia for instance, 
health service charges rose to 500% from D1.00 to D5.00 in the mid 1980s whilst education 
school  fees  increased  and  the  cost  of  school  furniture  was  bored  by  the  parents  without 




Neo-liberalism  [economic  globalisation]  is  not  the  natural  human  condition,  it  is  not 
supernatural, it can be challenged and replaced because its own failures will require this. We 
have  to  be  ready  with  replacement  policies  which  restore  power  to  communities  and 
democratic states while working to institute democracy, the rule of law and fair distribution at 
the international level. Business and the market have their place, but this place cannot occupy 





In this paper, I have critically looked at the economic globalisation thesis to contest its 
stereotypes on socio-economic development particularly in the Gambia. The thesis akin to the 
commodification and formalisation theses is presented as a process that will create jobs and 
resources for all whilst at the same time ensuring an adequate distribution for general survival 
and stability (Ambrose, 2004).  
I  have  also  tried  to  expose  the  performative  and  hallow  nature  of  the  economic 
globalisation thesis by putting the Gambia and its informal sector into perspective. Evidence 
produced in this paper demonstrates that the informal sector is not in demise but instead it is 
on the increase. Economic globalisation is presented as a natural and inevitable phenomenon 
that  cannot  be  resisted  or  influence  and  of  course  which  accommodates  no  potential 
alternatives. But as Massey (2005: 5: cited from Williams, 2005) pronounces 
 
Globalisation  in  its  current  form  is  not  the  result  of  a  law  of  nature  (itself  a 
phenomenon  under  dispute).  It  is  a  project…statements…such  as  there  is  no 
alternative…is not a description of the world [but]… an image in which the world is 
being made.  
The  process  of  economic  globalisation  has  also  being  a  source  of  socio-economic 
destabilisation and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa particularly the Gambia. Indeed 
it has been an awesome and terrifying phenomenon, enlivening the venomous potency of 
mass poverty and its accompanying multidimensional depravity of the citizenry of all the 
requisite essence of meaningful living (Akindele et al, 2002). 
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